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ABSTRACT
Securely operating large-scale networks is a non-trivial task involving interactions between
various hardware devices, protocols, and configurations, all of which need to work in tandem
for the network to be secure and in the desired state that the network administrators want
it to be in. Misconfigurations or malicious activities in the network can disrupt it resulting
in dire effects including but not limited to outages of critical applications and breach of
sensitive information.
In this work, we propose a robust framework for diagnosing such anomalies across enter-
prise networks, and study their impact in terms of changes in routing behavior and reacha-
bility. To study the network as closely as possible to its actual behavior we perform analysis
on data plane features as they govern the journey of a packet during its life-cycle across the
network. We perform temporal analysis of the network as a whole and inspect the evolution
of various properties. We then determine the deviation of the network relative to its previous
states and identify as accurately as possible if the current state is anomalous. Given the
historic states of the network over some time, we also try to infer high-level policies and
invariants in the network. These allow for running various verification techniques on the
network. Finally, we propose a network verification tool designed to verify the network as a
dynamic, multi-layer distributed system. The richness of this tool’s network model allows it
to find network issues that are not detectable using state of the art tools which work solely on
either data plane states or control plane states without examining the interaction of the two
among themselves and temporally with the network environment. Building on this verifica-
tion tool, we propose a technique for high-coverage testing of end-to-end network correctness
using the real software that is deployed in these networks; our design is effectively a hybrid,
using an explicit-state model checker to explore all network-wide execution paths and event
orderings, but executing real software as subroutines for each device. We show that this
approach can detect correctness issues that would be missed both by existing verification
and testing approaches, and a prototype implementation suggests that the technique can
scale to larger networks with reasonable performance.
Thus, our framework provides an end to end solution for network analysis, inference and
verification.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 ANALYSIS & INFERENCE
Given the enormous amount of network data that is obtained every day in production
networks, it becomes a challenging task to anlayze all that data in a meaningful way to
ensure that the network meets the desired properties at all times. The challenge is two-
fold; firstly, it becomes difficult to statistically view how the network evolves over time and
whether any given state of the network is anomalous relative to previous seen states and
secondly, its a challenge to infer what the underlying invariants/policies in the network are
given the tremendous amount of historic network snapshots/logs. There has been a lot of
work done to study historic network data and find anomalies and a lot of work has been
done to infer network policies for specific kinds of devices.
However, what the state of the art does not address is a wholesome anlaysis and inference
of the network as one entity. To this end, we propose:
1. A set of statistical analysis methods that do not require specific knowledge of the
network and consume the data plane state at different times to study network evolution
and identify unusual states.
2. A policy inference mechanism which finds the most frequently observed kinds of packets
exchanged between pairs of devices.
3. A summarization technique to find the minimum amount of data units to describe
network policies extracted by the inference mechanism which can be further fed into
network tools like automated invariant checkers and verifiers.
1.2 VERIFICATION & TESTING SOFTWARIZED NETWORKS
Beyond statistical methods, we also provide formal verification techniques for ensuring
correctness of networks which is a difficult yet critical task. A growing number of network
verification tools are targeted towards automating this process as much as possible, thereby
reducing the burden on the network operator. Verification platforms have improved steadily
in the recent years, both in terms of scope and scale. Starting from offline data plane
verification tools like Anteater [1] and HSA [2], the state of the art has evolved to support
real-time data plane verification [3, 4], and more recently, analysis of configurations [5, 6, 7,
8].
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Existing network verification techniques center around analysis of one or more individual
data plane states to verify policies of interest. In the case of data plane verifiers, a single data
plane state, often collected directly from the network, is presented as the network abstraction,
and is analysed for policy violations. While helpful, this approach does not verify the effect
of configuration prior to deployment. Configuration verification tools such as ERA, ARC
and Minesweeper start from the network configuration, but their approach is to encode the
control plane in models such as graphs or logical formulae, essentially designed to generate
one or more data plane states. These data plane states are computed as representation of
the outcome of the control plane execution. The actual analysis of the policy happens on
the individual data plane states that are generated in this manner.
But in reality, networks involve many dynamically moving parts. At the most basic level,
does the control plane converge? If so, can it converge to multiple states? How is traffic
affected as the system is being modified, either by a distributed control plane, or by SDN-
style software control of the data plane? Perhaps due to the sheer complexity of this network
system, verification tools have either ignored it altogether and focused on the results of the
control plane’s execution [6, 7, 8], or modeled specific forms of the dynamic behavior, such
as individual protocols [9, 10] or only the data plane [11].
As part of the final stage in the pipeline and as a solution to the aforementioned problems,
we propose Plankton, the first network verification platform that models the network as a
dynamic, multi-layer distributed system. This is a nontrivial goal. The system will have to
understand control plane dynamics, rather than simply computing a data plane output of
the control plane. However, the control plane does not exist in isolation; it must incorporate
data plane events, including perhaps sequences of multiple packets relevant to policies that
depend on actions across time. All of these cross-layer events may be woven together in
arbitrary order, creating exponential complexity as we scale to large networks.
Moving one step further, we realize that for a network incorporating extensive software
elements, assuming a network model becomes a serious limitation, for several reasons:
1. Implementation bugs: Given the highly specialized nature of middleboxes, there is
both a high likelihood of bugs, and also the risk of them being undiagnosed for a
significant length of time. These bugs (or simply implementation quirks) may cause
network policy violations even if the network operator has configured the middlebox
fully correctly. Writing a bug-for-bug faithful model of the software would be close to
impossible.
2. Lack of a model: Part of the point of building a softwarized network is to be able to
code custom features, behaviors, and even whole distributed systems. As such, we may
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lack a starting point for a model, unlike data plane and control plane elements that
typically operate with standardized protocols (BGP, spanning tree, etc.).
To address these shortcomings, we pose the question: how close can we come to getting
the best of both worlds, with the faithfulness of real software and the high coverage of
verification?
We initiate an exploration of that question with a hybrid approach. Intuitively, to retain
high accuracy, we need to execute the actual running software with its actual configuration
for each individual component. But we use those components, and partial executions of them,
as building blocks to assemble and reassemble in an exhaustive exploration of network-wide
execution paths driven by an explicit-state model checker. Our key contributions in this
regard are as follows:
1. We propose a hybrid approach combining emulation-based testing and model-based
verification, and show through examples that it can find intent violations that would
be missed by each approach individually.
2. We design such a hybrid system, Plankton-neo, which builds on the Plankton network
verification platform but inserts invokation of real software network elements in its
execution loop, inserting packets and interpreting the results. Our design explores
how to invoke these devices efficiently by doing both: running parallel instances and
state restoration.
3. We implement and evaluate a prototype of Plankton-neo, showing that it can catch
actual problems that rise with the iptables software firewall on Linux, and that it can
validate a multi-tenant data center with 196 routers and 64 tenants under 80 minutes.
3
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORKS
We use some of the techniques used for general purpose image similarity [12], video surveil-
lance [13] and measuring network complexity [14] as basis for our analysis module discussed
in Section 4.1. Some of the techniques used for network analysis and anomaly detection
involve traffic inspection [15, 16, 17, 18] however, the aim for our proposed technique was
to not require any form of packet inspection (headers or payload). There is recent literature
that focuses on specific kind of attack detection; like the problem of detecting Denial-of-
Service attacks has been modelled as a computer vision problem [19]. We aim to keep our
approach general enough so that any deviations in network state from the norm can be
identified.
In terms of network inference, as well, we aim to propose an all-encompassing technique
to detect network-wide policies and not limit the scope to specific network device types (for
example firewalls) as is done in some prior works [20, 21, 22].
Network verification has been thoroughly studied in the past body of works as well. The
earliest offline network verification techniques, such as Anteater [1] and HSA [2], evolved to
real-time tools such as Veriflow [3], NetPlumber [4] and DeltaNet [23]. However, these sys-
tems do not by themselves verify configurations prior to deployment. We compared Plankton
with existing configuration verifiers and compared experimentally to Minesweeper in Sec-
tion 6.2.3. There are also more specialized verifiers, such as Bagpipe [10] which verifies BGP
configurations for a single AS. Bagpipe avoids multi-AS dynamics, and does not incorporate
other control protocols or data plane behavior. CrystalNet [24] performs an emulation of
actual device virtual machines, and its results could be fed to a data plane verifier. How-
ever, this composition would not verify nondeterministic control plane dynamics, cross-layer
dynamics, or temporal policies. Simultaneously improving the fidelity of configuration ver-
ifiers in both dimensions (capturing dynamics as in Plankton and implementation-specific
behavior as in CrystalNet) appears to be a difficult open problem. Libra [25] is a divide-
and-conquer data plane verifier, which is related to our equivalence class-based partitioning
of possible packets. Topological symmetry in networks has also been explored in the con-
text of optimizing verification [26]. Plankton’s optimizations, though philosophically similar,
have been designed to accommodate protocol dynamics, unlike existing work which applies
these principles to data plane verification. Past approaches that used model checking in the
networking domain have focused almost exclusively on the network software itself, either
as SDN controllers, or protocol implementations [9, 27, 28]. We show how Plankton-neo
can help detect real issues in softwarized networks that would be missed by these existing
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techniques. Work on verifying dataplane software [29, 30] has focused on the correctness
of the software component itself, rather than end-to-end correctness, which Plankton-neo is
designed to verify. Architecturally, it shares many similarities with NICE [9], but targets
middleboxes instead of OpenFlow.
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CHAPTER 3: DESIGN
In this section we describe the complete design of our framework including all the com-
ponents in the pipeline. The first component of our framework is an analysis module which
ingests data plane state of the network at different time intervals and compares it with pre-
vious states of the network to inspect the evolution of the network over time. This enables
us to quantitatively identify if the network was in an anomalous state at a given time rela-
tive to previously witnessed states of the network. This module uses some approaches from
algorithmic information theory [31] in order to compute similarity of one network snapshot
with another to identify if one snapshot is deviating significantly from previous ones, acting
as a heuristic that signals that the network may need administrator attention. An in depth
discussion of how this is done is provided in Section 4.1.
Following this module, we present the policy inference engine, which given the data plane
state of the network at different time intervals, can output a minimum set of policies that
define the network. The policies describe which set of network devices mostly communicate
with which other set of network devices and over which packet sets. A lot of modern net-
working tools, like Veriflow [3], require the user to input some policies that help in describing
the network invariants before they can start performing any operations on the network, for
example verification of properties etc. When the network grows, it may be hard to exhaus-
tively describe the policies of the network for any such tools to optimally operate on the
network, and our policy inference engine aims to solve this problem. A detailed discussion
of the techniques applied in the inference and summarization of policies is done in Section
4.2.
Finally, we present our network verification tool. It uses principles of equivalence parti-
tioning along with explicit state model checking to reason about concurrency which, to the
best of our knowledge, the state of the art fails to address. Our tool does not treat a network
data plane or control plane in isolation, but, in fact, takes into account all the dynamically
moving parts of a network. It understands control plane dynamics rather than simply using
it to output a data plane and models the cross-layer events that may be woven together in
an arbitrary order creating exponential complexity of the network. As a result of applying
a suite of novel optimizations, including the use of some data structure optimizations and
parallelization of the system, it makes the process of dealing with such a complex system
efficient which we discuss in greater detail in Section 4.3.
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3.1 ANALYSIS
Figure 3.1: Analysis Module
The analysis module (an overview of which is shown in Figure 3.1) operates on a series
of time ordered snapshots of the network. The snapshots can be of various forms and
are processed so that we can obtain pair-wise reachability information between devices of
the network. Having this reachability information, we perform temporal analysis on how
reachability within the network changes over time and whether at some point in time the
reachability of the network was deviating from the statistical norm.
3.1.1 Collector
As an entry point, we need to collect the network data over a period of time for which
we use a collector. The implementation of this component was not in the scope of this work
(hence shown in dotted-lines in Figure 3.1) and we design our pipeline such that various
third-party collectors can be hooked and invoked from our pipeline. We omit details on the
workings of these collectors but provide a high level overview of how this component fits
within our analysis module and the overall pipeline. Depending on the network environment
and context, (for example enterprise networks, Internet ASes etc.) the job of this component
is to periodically gather information from the network. The nature of this information varies
between different types of networks which may provide a different perspective on reachability
within the network.
For instance, working in an enterprise network it would query all routing devices and collect
the output of various show commands (for example show interface, show ip interface, show
access-list, show ip route etc.) from each device in the network. Each of these commands
describes a particular data plane feature from the stand-point of that particular device and
this information is aggregated from all devices into a single raw network snapshot.
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Another example of the collection phase is of gathering global BGP peering information
from various vantage points including backbone routers on the Internet. This is done by
using data collected by Route Views [32] which provides an archive of a vast amount of histor-
ical BGP RIB (Routing Information Base) dumps and BGP UPDATE messages exchanged
between ASes.
3.1.2 Parser
After the collection of data is done from various heterogeneous network devices by different
vendors, running potentially different versions of the firmware and operating system, we
transform that information into a device agnostic format that we can use for our purposes.
Here again, we do not completely reinvent the wheel and choose not to develop our own
parsing component from scratch; instead we use the available tools and build on top of those.
We used a third-party parser that outputs a standardized device model representation for
each network feature of a routing device which works for most enterprise networks. Once
the data has been parsed and modeled, we use it to generate pair-wise reachability between
devices. This gives us information about the packet sets which this pair of devices can
exchange in the given state of the network and we use this information to generate an edge
list of reachability representing the entire network at this state.
For working with BGP data, we write a basic parsing component which ingests BGP RIB
format and outputs an edge list. We make use of libbgpdump [33] which is a C library
designed by RIPE NCC [34] to help with analyzing dump files produced by Zebra/Quagga
or MRT. Since the Route Views archives are in the Quagga format, this library is able to
open the dumps in a human readable format. We use Unix tools including cut and sed
along with some basic Python scripts to parse Route Views data after having passed it
through libbgpdump. An example input and output for BGP RIB is shown below along
with a minimal break down of the parsing steps:
1. Opening the BGP RIB dump through libbgpdump, a sample line of the output looks
like:
TABLE_DUMP|1201829525|B|149.20.65.198|1280|12.6.247.0/24
|1280 2828 7018 26456|IGP|149.20.65.198|0|30||NAG||
2. After the first pass of parsing this line using the command shown below, it becomes:
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cut -d ’|’ -f 6,7 | sed -e ’s#{\(.*\)}#\\1#’ -e ’s## #’
12.6.247.0/24|1280 2828 7018 26456
3. Next, we interpret the output of the previous step and turn it into an edge list such
that if some AS, say AS1 can reach AS2 either directly or through one or more hops,








We implement a graph generation module which ingests the standardized edge list format
from the file system and produces an in-memory weighted graph corresponding to each
snapshot. As the number of snapshots can be very large in some cases (discussed in Sectionn
5.2.1), it presents a few interesting challenges. Firstly, sequential graph generation for each
snapshot is a time consuming process so we leverage multiple cores to do this in parallel
giving us significant improvement in time taken to perform this action. Secondly, storing all
historic snapshots of a network in memory is impractical given memory constraints in most
typical compute environments therefore we keep only a window of these graphs in memory in
a fixed size queue and follow a FIFO ordering to discard the oldest graph and bring in a new
one if the queue is full up to the specified window size. For our comparisons and analysis,
discarding some previous data is acceptable and we later discuss the impact of doing this in
Section 5.2.1. For some of the techniques we will later discuss in Section 4.1.3 we require an
image representation of each graph object which is also handled by this module. It creates
the images and stores them in the file system for later access.
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3.1.4 Processor
The last stage of the analysis module is the processing of the generated graphs using
various techniques which will be discussed in Section 4.1. Each of the specific approaches we
use including Normalized Compression Distance (Section 4.1.3) on images and Graph Diff
(Section 4.1.1) are submodules which consume a set of graphs and output numeric metrics
corresponding to each snapshot.
Note that the analysis module is online in nature and any real time stream of network
data can be attached to this module. It will store a past window of network states in memory
and compare with the latest snapshot from the stream. This makes it highly practical for
use in production network environments.
3.2 INFERENCE
Figure 3.2: Inference Module
The inference engine is designed to load the data plane information from each snapshot of
the network and eventually insert that information in an R-Tree (the reasons for using this
particular data structure and how it is used are discussed in Section 4.2). The particular
format of the data plane that we use here is a list of packet sets that each pair of devices
in the network was able to exchange at a given snapshot. There are existing tools [3] that
can generate the particular packet sets which can be exchanged at particular snapshots by
processing the data plane state of the network so we do not discuss those specific details
here and make our module extensible to be able to consume this particular information from
other existing tools. We model the packet sets into K-dimensional objects (described
later in Section 4.2) that are later inserted into an R-Tree which is then used to query for
intersecting packet sets and eventually compute the frequently occuring packet sets in the
network. We implement this module entirely in C++ in favor of efficient performance and
make use of OpenMP [35] to parallelize various sections of the code including the loading
of snapshots, inserting them into an R-Tree and finding the intersections for various packet
sets.
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After we have computed the frequent packet sets (which are the pair-wise low-level policies)
we reduce this informaiton and aggregate it such that it becomes easier to comprehend and





Now we discuss the verification tool we implemented in this work, Plankton, and describe
various design choices that were made while implementing it.
The design decisions made in Plankton are aimed at tackling the challenges of cross-layer
dynamics, packet diversity, and event ordering. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, Plankton’s
model of the network is a collection of agents, each executing independently, making changes
to a shared global state of the network. The agent-based model allows Plankton to reason
accurately about the dynamics not only within the control plane, but also between the control
plane and the data plane. Given a configuration, Plankton formally analyzes its correctness
by interpreting it over the combined network model, and examining the behavior of the
model. To do so, Plankton uses an explicit-state model checker. The model checker is
designed to exhaustively search through the various interleaved executions of the agents,
and find any potential policy violations. However, naively modeling the individual agents
and passing them to a model checker does not suffice. Due to the large number of event
orderings, even a well-designed and mature model checker cannot scale to networks the
size of real world data centers or campus networks. In fact, past attempts to use model
checking even in settings significantly more restrictive than Plankton have failed to scale
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beyond networks of approximately 20 devices [9, 27]. Plankton tackles this problem through
a collection of highly effective optimizations. These optimizations are designed to either
reduce the overall number of event orderings to be checked without affecting correctness, or
to increase the efficiency of the exploration so that more orderings can be covered.
3.3.2 High-coverage testing of softwarized networks
Figure 3.4: Plankton-neo
Figure 3.4 illustrates the organization of Plankton-neo. It builds upon Plankton, which
uses model checking to formally verify network models. In Plankton, each logical compo-
nent of the network, such as the data plane, control plane protocols and the environment are
modeled as agents, which operate together to change the state of the overall network system.
These agents are written manually to simulate the behavior of the actual network compo-
nents, but with one key difference — they are designed to operate on equivalence classes of
packets rather than a single packet at a time. For example, the model for a stateful firewall
may define its behavior with respect to request and reply classes. The control plane models
perform route computation for each equivalence class separately. The model for the data-
plane forward a single symbolic packet through the dataplane, based on the forwarding rules.
The overall state of the network is defined as the combination of the states of component
models, and every time a step is taken within a model, the overall system is considered to
have made a state transition. A step may be a link failing, a routing table change, for-
warding of the symbolic packet from one device to the next etc. Assuming that the models
are faithful to the actual network behavior, Plankton can be used to verify a wide range of
correctness policies, including protocol convergence, failure tolerance etc. The actual verifi-
cation of the policy done by an off-the-shelf explicit-state model checker, which exhaustively
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explores every relevant execution of the overall network system, and locates any sequence of
events that can violate network correctness. As the name suggests, the explicit-state model
checker generates and checks each relevant state of the system separately.
The design we described in Section 3.3.2 uses a separate set of virtual interfaces for each
middlebox in the network. Alternatively, we can also have multiple middleboxes sharing
the same set of emulation setups. This is possible because the model checking algorithm
only checks the behavior of one middlebox at any given time. When the packet needs to be
injected into a particular middlebox, we run that middlebox over the virtual interfaces, and
use update replay to put the system in the required state. The performance implications of
this are discussed in Section 6.2.4.
We implemented a simple version of our technique over Plankton, with support for Linux-
based middleboxes. For emulating Virtualized Network Function (VNF) devices, we create
tap interfaces, and create separate routing tables in the kernel for the emulated middleboxes.
When the verification algorithm invokes packet injection, the representative is sent into the
appropriate tap interface. A special data payload is used to distinguish the injected packet
from any other packets that may originate from the kernel. If the packet does not make it
to any of the tap interfaces withing a configurable timeout, it is assumed to be dropped.
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CHAPTER 4: TECHNIQUES & IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 ANALYSIS
This section describes several network analysis techniques that were explored and imple-
mented in the framework we propose.
For analyzing networks over time, we model them as graphs of two types. First, we model
the adjacency of network entities as is in the context of the network we are analyzing. For
example, if we are running this framework on a BGP network (let’s say on the AS level of the
Internet) then the adjacency graph would represent the direct BGP peer relations between
the ASes as we see them in the BGP RIB and BGP UPDATES. As another example, if
we are working on enterprise networks then this would be direct hops between routers; this
could be the result of static route configurations done by network administrators or running
routing algorithms like OSPF.
Second, we model the reachability of network entities as a result of running basic graph
algorithms on top of the adjacency graph. Initially we implemented Floyd-Warshall algo-
rithm [36] for computing shortest paths between all possible pairs of nodes in the graph,
however the time complexity for doing this is O(N3) in the number of nodes (N) in the
graph which posed a lot of scaling challenges. Given the size of data we were dealing with,
for example a set of AS level graphs with roughly 7716 nodes and 733 such graphs to process,
this particular approach seemed unfeasible due to the enormously large amount of time it
would require. Since we did not expect to have negative cycles in our graphs, we decided to
go with using Dijkstra’s algorithm [37] for computing the single-source shortest path to all
nodes from each possible source. Each run of this takes O(ElogN) time in the number of
nodes (N) and the number of edges (E) in the graph. However, running this for all sources
increases the time taken to complete significantly so this approach was also discarded. We
finally decided to use Bread First Search [38] from all source nodes in the graph and used
this to generate a reachability graph which had an edge between two nodes, say A → B if
there was at least one path in the network to reach B from A. We do not model protocol
specific reachability in this approach (for example we don’t take into account BGP peering
relationships like customer/peer/provider etc.) for now.
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4.1.1 Graph Diff
As a baseline, we treat the generated graphs using existing techniques which work directly
on these graph representations. We partially follow the approach proposed by Bunke et al.
[39] in this regard. Given a time ordered series of graphs G1, G2, G3, ... , Gn we compute
pair-wise distances D(Gi, Gj) between these graphs such that i > j for all values of i and j
that obey this constraint. This translates into computing distances between all (or a subset
of all) graphs that precede graph Gi in time. The more this value turns out to be, the greater
the difference between the two graphs. We define the distance metric as follows:
D(Gi, Gj) = | Ni | + | Nj | − 2 | Ni ∩Nj | + | Ei | + | Ej | − 2 | Ei ∩ Ej |
where | Nx | is the number of nodes in graph x
and | Ex | is the number of edges in graph x
Computing this graph diff measure helps us visualize the evolution of networks over time
and any aberrations in this trend are indicators of sudden changes in the network state which
may need administrator attention. We compute this metric over a window of past network
states and compute the average over all those comparisons.
4.1.2 Image Representation of Network Reachability
We generate an adjacency matrix for each graph object and turn this into an image by
representing reachability between a pair of devices by the presence or absence of a pixel in
the appropriate position of the image. Each node would have some coordinate on the x-axis
of the image and some coordinate on the y-axis of the image. If two nodes, say A and B,
have some notion of reachability in the graph such that A can “reach” B, then on the image
we would produce a pixel to represent this information. Assuming that the position of A on
the x-axis and y-axis is posAx and posAy respectively and the position of B on the x-axis
and y-axis is posBx and posBy respectively then there would be a pixel on the coordinate
(posAx, posBy) in the image. If the notion of reachability is bidirectional then there would
also be a pixel in coordinate (posBx, posAy) in the image.
In some datasets, if we map the devices with their default identities on to our image
space, the resulting images may be really sparse and may consume a lot of space on disk
while storing the images causing more expensive I/O operations while processing them. For
example, using default AS numbers poses this problem as the entire AS number range has
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not been used but AS numbers lie all across the space of the 16-bit number. Therefore, the
resulting matrix and the corresponding image is extremely sparse taking up more space than
is necessary. We apply sparsity reduction on this by mapping this AS number space range
on to a shrunk down version by re-assigning AS numbers to a smaller (minimum) range such
that all numbers are used. In the case of doing retrospective analysis, we do this by taking
a union of all the nodes present in the dataset. From this resulting set, we reassign each
node’s ID between 0 and the numbers of nodes in this union set, say N . This brings down
the matrix size and image sparsity significantly. The result of this can be seen in Figure
4.1 where the network adjacency images are shown before applying this sparsity reduction
optimization and after this. This has significant performance benefits as it brings down the
image size per network snapshot considerably; for instance in the network snapshot shown
the image size goes down from 2.3MB down to 1.7MB (26% decrease in file size). This
results in a lower memory footprint of the application (if some images are kept in-memory)
and also results in faster processing when comparing images and compressing images as will
be discussed later. From our benchmarks (discussed in Section 6.2.1), it is evident that
storing all images (network snapshots) in memory is not the bottleneck, it’s in fact the time
taken to compare that grows faster than memory consumption.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Showing the image representation of network adjacency from AS-733 dataset
as of 21st November 1999. (a) shows the sparse matrix version with some data points seen
further away towards top right/bottom right/top left and (b) shows the optimized matrix
version after sparsity reduction.
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4.1.3 Image Similarity
As described in Section 4.1.2 we can represent the binary reachability information at each
snapshot of the network using an image. We then explore some techniques widely used in
computer graphics to compute similarity of images, which translate into similarity in the
nature of reachability of devices in the network between a set of snapshots. This metric
helps us identify how much the reachability properties of the network vary in the current
snapshot being evaluated compared with the past set of snapshots that we are comparing
with. It proves to be a good network-wide statistical indicator of how the network compares
with a past state and given the usual nature of networks we explore, the variation in between
snapshots does not adversely affect the inferences we make from employing this technique.
The result of using this technique on some real world data will be discussed in Section 5.1.
Normalized Compression Distance
Lots of computer graphics problems have to use image similarity metrics for rendering,
determining visual quality of frames and so on. Thus, a vast body of work is present which
tries to address this but most of them work only for specific use-cases. An example is that
of using Mean Squared Error (MSE) which compares pixel-to-pixel for computing a certain
distance. This may not work in all cases, for example if the pixels are all shifted by a
constant factor in one image. To counter such challenges and have a more general robust
technique some work has been done in the field of algorithmic complexity and a new measure
of similarity has been proposed named Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) [40]
based on Kolmogorov Complexity [41]. We define Kolmogorov Complexity of a string w
with respect to L, denoted KL(w) as the shortest computer program on a universal computer
(such as a universal Turing Machine) written in language L which produces w as output.
The conditional Kolmogorov Complexity, which is of interest to us for comparing objects,
with respects to a string x, denoted KL(w | x) (spoken w given x, as in probability theory),
is the length of the shortest program which, when given x as input, outputs w [42]. Although
Kolmogorov Complexity is not computable, we will discuss in the following paragraph how
it can be approximated leading to the NCD.
Bennet et al. [43] define information distance between two (potentially unequal sized)
binary strings, as the length of transforming either string into the other (both ways). Li et
al. [40] propose a normalized version of the same metric called similarity metric which
like the previous metric, is also universal. As mentioned earlier, Kolmogorov Complexity
can only be approximated, we use real-world compressors to compute the NCD and use it
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to compare images. As evaluated by Vázquez et al. [12] NCD works well on images under
certain constraints which we follow in our framework and discuss later on. Now we formally
present the definition of Normalized Compression Distance as:
NCD(X, Y ) =
C(X, Y )−min{C(X), C(Y )}
max{C(X), C(Y )}
where C(F )is the size after compression of a file F
and XY is the concatenation of files X and Y.
Some other things to note about NCD (in context of our usage):
1. The values of NCD lie between [0,1.1]. Typically, similarity measure lies in the range
[0,1] but due to real-world compressor imperfections, NCD observes values a little
higher than this. Lower values signify a high similarity and higher values signify lower
similarity between the two given input objects.
2. Before using a compressor for NCD computation we need to ensure that it obeys the
properties analyzed by Cilibrasi et al. [44]. Most real-world compressors (like BZIP
[45], LZMA (Lempel Ziv Markov chain algorithm) [46] etc.) obey these.
Now that we have defined what the similarity metric used in our technique precisely is, we
discuss how we use this to analyze real-world networks. We operate on a time ordered set
of network images as described above and compare each of these images with a window of
previous images. For example, if we are at time T55 and the window size, which we denote
as W is equal to 10, then the two metrics we compute for the network at time T55 are as
follows:
NCDT55 = max{NCD(IT55 , IT54), NCD(IT55 , IT53), .., NCD(IT55 , IT45)}
AV G NCDT55 = mean{NCD(IT55 , IT54), NCD(IT55 , IT53), ..,
= NCD(IT55 , IT45)}
where ITx is the image corresponding to the network at time x
The first metric reports the maximum dissimilarity from among a window of previous
network states and the second metric reports how much the current state is dissimilar from
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among a window of previous network states on average. Having both these metrics, we
are able to visualize, using trend lines, how the network evolves over time. We use various
parameters for the window size and compare the results in Section 5.5. The assumption
that is satisfied by most networks is that given an appropriate sampling period, the network
would not significantly deviate its reachability state on the scale of that sampling period.
If either of these metrics report otherwise (ignoring the minor deviations) then a potential
abnormality may have occurred (or in the process of occurring) and thus, manual intervention
and inspection may be required.
As part of this technique, we also employed a technique for computing Manhattan Dis-
tance between the images but the results of that were similar to the Graph Diff approach
discussed earlier so we omit the details for that. We also implemented an approach which
is a slight variation of NCD used in [13] the field of anomaly detection in surveilance of
video feeds however, the general trend of the results obtained using this formulation and the
implementation details are similar to the NCD technique therefore we also omit the details
for that in the interest of space.
4.2 INFERENCE
In this section we describe how our policy inference engine works. When we talk of network
policies we mean sets of conditions, constraints or properties that the network obeys at some
given state. These policies dictate access control within network and control the flow of traffic
between different entities.
As networks evolve over time, they undergo changes in terms of addition and removal
of devices, rules, configurations etc. To keep track of all these events in the networks’s
history proves to be a cumbersome task because the amount of information associated with
such events can be very large making processing that information a challenging problem.
On the other hand, this information is required to some extent in order to perform crucial
actions on the network like invariant verification and policy-based management to name a
few. The underlying assumption behind the proper execution of all these actions is correct
information about the network which we want to verify or manage. This brings us back to
the problem of how we can retain this information as the network itself grows larger and
keeps getting more complicated. In this section, we aim to propose a solution to inferring
valuable information about underlying network policies from a series of snapshots which can
be used for performing the aforementioned actions.
As was being done in the analysis stage, we ingest data plane state of the network at
different points in time. However, the output from this stage of the pipeline is a set of policies
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that define the network. This includes low-level policies that tell us what packet sets are
exchanged between pairs/sets of devices and also high-level policies that are an accumulation
of similar low-level policies. As a first step to our approach, we aim to identify the most
frequently exchanged packet sets that were exchanged between pairs of devices and we do
this for all pairs in the network. A packet set is modeled as a K-dimensional shape where
each dimension is one field of the packet. For example, if we are considering the following
fields in the packet (from different layers of the OSI Model [47]):




then each of these fields would be one dimension of our K-dimensional shape (which we
will call KD-Rectangle) that can be visualized as shown in Figure. 4.2.
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Populate the R-Tree with all packet sets exchanged between
devices D1 and D2 and call it R
(4.1)
Initialize set Q equal to all packet sets in R (4.2)
Qres = {}(HashMap) (4.3)
Repeat steps 4.5 to 4.10 until Q is not empty (4.4)
Qnext = {} (4.5)
For all packet sets p ∈ Q, query for the intersecting packet sets
using the R-Tree R
(4.6)
Assume that for packet set p the intersecting packet sets are
stored in set S such that S ⊂ Q
(4.7)
Qres.insert(p, length(S)) (4.8)
For each packet set s in S, find the intersecting region between
s and p called q (another packet set); Qnext = Qnext ∪ {q}
(4.9)
Q = Qnext (4.10)
Sort Qres by value (4.11)
The algorithm shown previously (Algorithm 4.1) is an iterative approach to computing the
overlapping packet sets which appear most frequently across time between a pair of devices.
We start with the actual packet sets observed and insert all of them into an R-Tree [48]
data structure. The reason for using this particular data structure is that it is very efficient
for spacial access methods, that is for indexing multi-dimensional information such as our
K-Dimensional packet sets in space where time is an added dimension (signifying at what
particular times each of those packet sets was observed as being exchanged between a given
pair of devices.) The fundamental idea behind R-Trees is that they group nearby objects and
represent them using a minimum bounding rectangle. These minimum bounding rectangles
indicate whether or not a search query should search in a given subtree making this process
efficient. Searching time complexity for our practical purposes is on average logarithmic in
the number of nodes in the tree.
For each of the packet sets we have inserted in the R-Tree, we query the R-Tree to give
us the overlapping packet sets with the querying packet set. This, in the context of the
problem we are solving, gives us other packet sets that were seen at another time which have
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at least some intersecting region with the current packet set being queried. Having access
to these overlapping packet sets, we identify which region of each of these packet sets has an
overlap with the queried packet set and use this overlapping part of the packet set (or the
inner packet set) in the next iteration to look for further intersections. Since we are trying
to find the most frequently exchanged packet sets, we keep narrowing down the size of our
packet sets and search for more dense or highly overlapping regions in our K-Dimensional
space and keep track of the number of intersections of each packet set in our HashMap
called Qres. Ultimately, when no more subsequent inner packet sets are found and we have
scanned all intersections, the querying iterations end. At this point, we sort Qres by value
and report the top k packet sets. This terminates the algorithm and we have extracted the
low-level pair-wise policies which have remained the most consistent in time. Of course, the
most frequent policies may not be the most up-to-date policies (since the administrator may
have just recently updated some policies which are still not frequent enough to be captured
by this algorithm) in which case we can put constraints on how far back in time we need
to query. We can also prevent the addition of the stale packet sets in the R-Tree at the
beginning of the algorithm. We may also choose to apply a filtering pass on the frequent
packet sets that the algorithm reports in the end to prune out those packet sets which have
some intersection with our blacklist of packet sets.
4.2.1 Reduction
Next, we use the pair-wise packet sets computed above (which we call the low-level policies)
to aggregate them into a more succint form of information that can be fed into other tools
or used for human inspection of the network policies.
The pair-wise policies computed earlier are of the following form (where A, B, C, ..., F
are devices and PS1, PS2, ... are unique packet sets):
{(A → B: PS1), (A → B: PS2), (A → B: PS3)}
{(A → D: PS1), (A → D: PS2), (A → D: PS3)}
{(C → D: PS1), (C → D: PS3)}
{(E → F: PS1), (E → F: PS3)}
On this, we apply the first phase of aggregation which is kind of a like a reverse index,
making a list of pairs for each unique packet set. The result is of the following form:
PS1 = {A → B, A → D, C → D, E → F}
PS2 = {A → B, A → D}
PS3 = {A → B, A → D, C → D, E → F}
Now we apply the second phase of aggregation which groups together similar pairs of
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devices. This is done by searching for the longest intersecting set of device-pairs from the
above lists. For each of these sets, we enumerate the packet sets that they were picked from.
For example, considering the above list we see that the following set of pairs is the longest
set that is present in at least two lists (namely PS1 and PS3, in the previous example):
{(A → B), (A → D), (C → D), (E → F)}
Thus, we obtain a grouping from the above set as follows:
{A → B, A → D, C → D, E → F: PS1, PS3}
We keep doing this until we are unable to find any intersecting sets at which point we just
merge the remaining results into our grouping. Thus, the final groupinng of the previous
example would look like:
{A → B, A → D, C → D, E → F: PS1, PS3}
{A → B, A → D: PS2}
This results in a minimum bundle of devices obeying the same policies and we have
reduced the information (or data units) into a much smaller output size which is much more
comprehensible and can describe the network policies using this minimum set of data units.
4.3 VERIFICATION
Now we discuss the network verification tool in detail including discussion of packet equiv-
alnce classes, the explicit-state model checker used by the tool, the roles performed by the
various agents which model the various events executed in the network and how the policies
are verified as a result of all these components. We also discuss the hybrid approach of using
explicit-state model checking along with emulation-based testing and how we implement
that for our framework.
4.3.1 Packet Equivalence Classes
The first form of equivalence that Plankton relies on for scalable network verification is
packet equivalence. Plankton slices the network into Packet Equivalence Classes (PECs),
and explores the dynamics of each PEC (or a small number of PECs) separately. PECs have
been defined in various ways in existing verification literature. Dataplane verifiers such as
Veriflow [3] define them over data plane rules, whereas the configuration analysis tool ERA
[6] defines them over control plane message paths. Since Plankton checks not just the current
network state but also many possible future states with various changes, we define PECs to
guarantee that two packets that are in the same class in the original network state continue
to be so even after any topological or other changes that may be explored by Plankton. There
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are multiple ways in which we can ensure this, and Plankton’s design does not mandate a
particular way of computation. One possible approach is to consider the prefixes described
in the network-wide protocol configuration, and compute boolean combinations (through
intersection & set difference) of these prefixes. This approach is similar to how a data plane
veriifier would compute data plane equivalence classes. Indeed, such a computation produces
a similar number of PECs as a data plane verifier such as Veriflow. Nevertheless, this set is
finer than necessary for ensuring Plankton’s correctness. In order to obtain a more compact
set, we can unify those PECs which have the same configuration network-wide. For example,
multiple prefixes originating from the same router can be treated as a single PEC, if their
behavior is identical throughout the network. This approach produces a relatively small
number of PECs, which are used to define the input to the explicit exploration component.
Our experiments are carried out using PECs defined in this manner.
For each PEC, Plankton defines a software model that encompasses the entire network and
its environment. It is these models that are checked by the second component of Plankton,
the model checker.
4.3.2 Explicit-state model checker
The explicit state model checker SPIN [49] provides Plankton its exhaustive exploration
ability. A model checker for software programs, SPIN verifies models written in the Promela
modeling language, which has constructs to describe possible non-deterministic behavior.
Plankton’s network model is essentially a software copy of the network written in Promela.
While the model is defined for each PEC, SPIN verifies only a small number n of them at
any given time, depending on the policy under verification. For most policies, n is 1, whereas
some policies may require two, or more. An example of a policy that requires more than one
PEC to be modeled is stateful reachability, which enforces that if a request is delivered,
the reply gets delivered too. The model consists of a collection of agents, each responsible
for one component of the network system. An agent may represent a protocol such as OSPF
or BGP, the data plane which forwards traffic, the failure agent that changes the topology
etc.
Plankton’s model of the network executes iteratively, making multiple non-deterministic
choices in each iteration. First, an agent is picked non-deterministically from among those
that are ready to execute. This is followed by non-deterministic choice of the network de-
vice or link where the agent shall make changes. Further non-deterministic choices may be
made as applicable in the protocol. For example, the forwarding agent non-deterministically
decides the next-hop to forward to, when multipath load balancing is in use. As we shall dis-
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cuss later, for each non-deterministic selection, the possible set of choices is restricted by the
policy being verified. While such non-deterministic choices occur in simulation based anal-
ysis also, simulation explores network evolution only along one non-deterministic execution
path. The model checker in Plankton explores every possible non-deterministic execution
path, checking for policy violations along each of these paths. As the name suggests, the
explicit-state model checker performs this exploration one state at a time. This distinguishes
it from symbolic model checkers, which explore sets of states simultaneously. Unlike sym-
bolic model checkers, explict-state model checkers do not require the transition relation of
the system to be computed a-priori. SPIN’s exploration of program execution proceeds as
a traversal of the state transition graph. In the case of plankton, this traversal is made
practical through efficient state-keeping, and optimizations both inside SPIN (such as Bit-
state Hashing) as well as our own additional ones. SPIN checks the specified policy over the
paths that are observed while traversing the graph - an approach known as on-the-fly model
checking [50].
Agents
Agents in Plankton’s network model define the behavior of the various moving parts in the
network. In addition to the environment (topology changes) and control protocols, Plankton
defines an controller agent and a data plane agent. Each agent defines state variables that
become part of the overall system state, and actions that will update these state variables.
Protocol agents for standard control protocols are semantically quite straightforward. For
instance, the BGP agent defines BGP tables, import and export of routes, and the BGP
decision procedure. The OSPF agent performs shortest-path routing. The controller agent
installs an ordered stream of updates from an external entity to each switch, chosen in
non-determinsitc order. This agent is designed to capture the semantics of SDNs, manual
installation of static routes etc.
The agent that allows Plankton to check forwarding issues, including middleboxes, is the
data plane agent. For each equivalence class, the data plane agent moves exactly one packet
through the network. This is essentially a symbolic packet, intended to capture how the
data plane forwards and is affected by traffic. The forwarding agent adds two variables to
the overall network state: the starting point of the packet, and its current location. When a
packet reaches a dynamic data plane device, the data plane agent performs any updates that
are made by the device to the actual data plane. By interleaving execution of the forwarding
agent with others, Plankton can detect policy violations that are not present in any single
data plane state, but are experienced by specific packets.
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Policies
Plankton allows a wide range of policies to be checked over individual packets, data plane
states or the control plane. Policies that describe the forwarding path of the packet are
expressed as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae. LTL is a logic system for describ-
ing execution paths of finite state machines, and is natively supported by SPIN. LTL in-
cludes operators to describe temporal behavior, such as G for Always, F for Future, and
U for Until. These operators are used to describe expected packet behavior in Plankton.
For example, loop freedom is expressed as G(packetLocation != startingPoint => (G
(packetLocation != startingPoint))) which stands for Once the packet location is not
equal to the starting point, it will always be not equal to the starting point. Since the start-
ing point is non-deterministically chosen by the forwarding agent, this policy covers any
forwarding loop in the data plane. Policies that do not involve interleaving of the control
plane and the data plane can be checked without a forwarding agent. The data plane state
is part of the overall network state, and a graph algorithm over the current data plane is
sufficient to check most of such policies. This approach, which is significantly faster than
having a forwarding agent, is similar in spirit to Veriflow. The policy definition will include
a callback that accepts the current network state as an argument, and after checking the
policy, sets appropriate flags to represent the outcome of the check. However, checking
the policy efficiently requires more than a fast analysis algorithm. Plankton relies on the
policy definition to supply any optimizations that may be safely applied to the exploration
process, without compromising the correctness of the check. In other words, when faced
with a set of non-deterministic choices, the policy must convey to Plankton which of those
must be necessarily checked, and which may be skipped, without missing a potential viola-
tion. This responsibility is assigned to the policy because in general, a policy may require
that one specific network state is not reached by the network, and a fully policy-agnostic
optimization scheme may eliminate that particular state from the exploration. In general,
policy-agnostic optimization would put restrictions on the set of policies that may be checked
using Plankton. Hence, we choose against that option.
Recall that Plankton’s network model performs successive iterations of agent selection,
location selection and agent execution. For each of the non-deterministic selection points in
an iteration, the policy needs to supply to the model checker a set of options to choose from,
through callbacks. Specifically, callbacks are defined for the following:
• Protocol selection: While a large number of protocols may be prepared to execute
at a given point of time, only a subset of them may be relevant to producing an
interesting execution path. The purpose of this callback is to prune the set of non-
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deterministic choices to those that are indeed relevant. The callback is expected to set
flags corresponding to individual protocols, indicating that they may execute. Plankton
non-deterministically picks (in other words, exhaustively explores) one protocol from
among them to execute.
• Location selection: Similar to protocol selection, this callback is expected to prune
the set of nodes/links where the chosen protocol is allowed to make a change.
• Agent-specific callbacks: Individual agents may define additional callbacks, to op-
timize their execution. For example, the forwarding agent defines a callback to prune
the possible set of next-hops when there are multiple possible next-hops are defined in
the data plane (like in ECMP).
4.3.3 Hybrid: explicit-state model checking + emulation-based testing
Incorporating real software
In Plankton-neo, we leverage Plankton’s explicit-state model checking framework, but
adapt it for Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). While much of the network is still
represented using models operating on symbolic packets, middlebox software execute in
their original form. For each middlebox in the network, a “virtual device” is created, which
consists of virtual interfaces in one-to-one correspondence with the actual interfaces on the
middlebox, and running the same software. The configuration supplied to the middlebox is
updated to operate over the virtual interfaces rather than the original physical interfaces.
Since middlebox software can work only with concrete packets and not equivalence classes, a
fully instantiated representative is picked for each equivalence class. The difference between
a symbolic packet and a representative packet is subtle, but important. A symbolic packet is
a logical entity, that merely denotes an equivalence class, whereas a representative packet is
a real packet that can be processed by network devices, chosen from the many packets that
constitutes the equivalence class. We elaborate on the computation of equivalence classes
and the selection of the representatives later.
Similar to Plankton, the model checking algorithm exhaustively explores the various ex-
ecution paths of system, for each equivalence class. The distinction from Plankton lies in
behavior of the dataplane model. While it still defines a single symbolic packet and moves
it through the network, when the symbolic packet reaches a middlebox, the representative
packet for the equivalence class is injected into the appropriate interface of the emulated
copy of the middlebox. Then, the fate of the injected packet is observed, and the dataplane
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model interprets the observation as an action performed on the symbolic packet. In essence,
each middlebox defines an “API” that allows verification algorithm to query for the outcome
of packets reaching one of the interfaces. Using such a system, we can verify a variety of
policies about end-to-end correctness of the network. Perhaps the most relevant are policies
that pertain to how the network changes its behavior in response to traffic. For example,
a network with a web-cache may state that No HTTP requests are sent to the server more
than once. The model checker that we inherit from Plankton natively supports such temporal
policies as was discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Saving and restoring middlebox state
As the model checking algorithm exhaustively searches through possible executions of the
network looking for policy violations, it will be required to perform packet injection into
various middleboxes many times, under various hypothetical scenarios. Each time such an
injection happens, the intention of the algorithm is to observe the fate of the packet if it was
to reach the middlebox under the specific circumstances that the algorithm has contrived.
So, we require the virtual middlebox to match the algorithm’s intended state before the
packet can be injected. In order to do so, we implement the network model in the following
way: In addition to the middlebox software running on the emulated interfaces, for each
middlebox, we define a model within the verifier itself. The purpose of the model is to
keep track of the state changes that occur to the middlebox during the execution of the
verification algorithm. Specifically, the state of this model is defined as the initial state,
plus a list of all updates that have been made to the middlebox. We define the model to
track two types of updates: any changes to the routing table, and any packets that were
previously injected, along with the interfaces where the injection happened. When a new
packet needs to be injected into a middlebox, we first match the emulator state with the
one in the model — by first restarting middlebox software with the initial configuration,
and then replaying all the historical updates that have supposedly happened in the past.
This approach of putting a middlebox into a desired state is attractive, because it does not
require any knowledge of the internal workings of the software. It is also more practical than
snapshotting the virtual memory of the middlebox in order to store its state. However, it
does assume that the software is deterministic, and has no dependency on timing. In other
words, starting from an initial state, replaying the same sequence of updates is guaranteed




We use our image representation of adjacency and reachability graphs of the networks
to visualize how the networks evolve over time. These, of course, are not any quantitative
measure of reasoning about the network over time but still prove to be an interesting by-
product of the techniques we apply for further analysis. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how dense
the AS connectivity gets over time showing the addition of more entities in the network.
5.2 ANOMALY DETECTION
5.2.1 Normalized Compression Distance
One of the publicly available datasets that we use in this work is from the Stanford Large
Network Dataset Collection [51] called as-733 which is a dataset representing communication
networks of who-talks-to-whom from the BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) logs. The data
was collected from University of Oregon Route Views Project [32] data and reports. The
dataset contains 733 daily instances which span an interval of 785 days from November 8
1997 to January 2 2000 mostly on 24 hour intervals.
Figure 5.3 shows the NCD of the network adjacency graph. In the context of BGP,
this shows the difference in the direct connections that can be inferred from the BGP RIB
dumps of a given state relative to all previous states. As can be seen, there is a fair amount of
churn in these values on the sampling granularity of 1 snapshot per 24 hours. Lots of peering
relationships change. However, if the sampling is made more frequent and the number of
comparisons or the window size is changed accordingly, one can tweak the granularity and
the sensitivity at which one desires to see changes. The image also shows a few spikes where
significant changes in the network were observed. For example, on 29th December 1998 there
is a sharp decline in the number of nodes and edges that were observed, thus a large value
of NCD can be seen. Previously, the nodes were roughly 4500 and edges were roughly 17000
but at this date, nodes fell down to 493 and edges fell down to 2379. It is also interesting to
see the network slowly converge back to the desired state as the value of NCD goes back to
the normal trend line. This was clearly an anomaly that this technique was able to capture.
Figure 5.4 shows the NCD of the network reachability graph. As we describe earlier





Figure 5.1: Showing the image representation of network reachability from AS-733 dataset
at 6 month intervals from 8th November 1997 to 8th November 1999. Starting from top left
to bottom right, each image is the reachability between ASes on the Internet. The images get






Figure 5.2: Showing the image representation of network adjacency from AS-733 dataset at
6 month intervals from 8th November 1997 to 8th November 1999. Starting from top left to
bottom right, each image is the adjacency between ASes on the Internet. The images get
more packed with pixels (i.e. more adjacency relations are being added) with the passage of




Figure 5.3: Showing the NCD computed for adjacency graphs of the AS-733 dataset where
each network state is compared to 100 previous states (i.e. W = 100) (a) NCD vs Time. (b)
NCD vs Time (denoised)
nodes on the graph. The NCD between reachability across snapshots also varies varies by
some amount due to the constantly changing nature of the network but there are certain
significant spikes that correspond to anomalous changes in reachability across ASes. This is
also following the same trend as can be seen in the NCD for the adjacency graph from Figure




Figure 5.4: Showing the NCD computed for reachability graphs of the AS-733 dataset where
each network state is compared to 100 previous states (i.e. W = 100) (a) NCD vs Time. (b)
NCD vs Time (denoised)
graph can be analyzed from anomalies. However, one thing to note is the NCD values
are lower for reachability graphs (shown in Figure 5.4) compared with the NCD values for
adjacency graphs (shown in Figure 5.3) showing that there is less change in reachability even
though adjacency changes more. This is because even if direct peering relationships change
between ASes on the Internet, there can still be some other route through which an AS can
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Figure 5.5 shows the effect of varying the window size parameter which dictates how many
comparisons have to be made to determine the NCD of each network snapshot. It is clear
that a very small value (for example when W = 10) gives a lot of noise and variation in the
value for NCD. This is because on the time scale that network state has been captured for
this particular dataset (every 24 hours), the network state changes a lot due to a high traffic
of BGP exchange messages. Thus, the value for window size is highly tied with the nature of
the network as on the scale of the Internet, there would be a lot of churn expected as peering
relationships change and the paths keep switching. On the scale of, say an enterprise network
or a university network, the relationship between network devices and the reachability would
remain fairly constant and less churn would be observed. However, as we average out the
NCD with a larger previous window (for example W = 100 or W = ALL) the variation
between the values is much less and an upward trend can be observed which shows how the
network evolves over the years. The number of ASes increases, peering relationships grow
thus making the graph much denser in the number of edges; this gradual growth can be
visualized in the trend.
5.2.2 Graph Diff
Figure 5.6a shows the Graph Diff for two different window sizes on the same adjacency
network. It can be observed that a larger window size (or even all previous network states in
this particular demonstration) shows a growing trend in the network and hides the variations
on a smaller time scale. A smaller window size (of 10 previous comparisons in this particular
demonstrations) is able to capture much more accurately the difference of a state with some
previous states and is more sensitive to changes. Again, it depends on the requirement what
window size the user chooses to set as each poses its own nature of comparison and trade
offs. We also compare the Graph Diff values for adjacency and reachability graphs of the
same network (in Figure 5.6b) with the same window size (i.e. W = 10 in this example) and
notice that reachability changes are higher in value by orders of magnitude. This is because
the graph has more entities for reachability (more edges in particular) and the changes in
those are higher in number as a consequence. The trend of both these metrics, however, is
largely the same.
35
5.2.3 Comparing NCD with Graph Diff
It can be seen in Figure 5.7 that both NCD and Graph Diff techniques show the same
general trend across time. Whenever there is a drastic spike, indicating anomalous snapshots,
both of the techniques are able to convey this information. However, as can be noted that
the sensitivity to changes in the networks are different for both techniques; graph diff is not
able to capture the smaller changes in the networks because it only considers a change in
the number of entities in the network (i.e. the number of unique and common devices and
edges) whereas NCD is able to capture the difference in relation more closely by computing
how much loss of information occurs in the network as a whole across snapshots. Therefore,
depending on the sensitivity demands of the user, both techniques present valid use-cases.
5.3 INFERENCE
We test our inference engine on private data collected from a major enterprise network.
The dataset contained three years (2014-2016) worth of network snapshots with each snap-
shot consisting of approximately 200 - 400 routing devices belonging to a number of different
vendors. Using some techniques by Veriflow, we were able to determine the packet sets ex-
changed on each snapshot. We use those packet sets to isnert into our R-Tree and then
perform the techniques discussed in Section 4.2. The results are shown in Figure 5.8 which
demonstrate the reduction in information size as a result of our technique showing the in-
ferred low-level policies and high-level policies are much more easier to comprehend and feed
to other tools.
5.4 VERIFICATION
We implemented a prototype of Plankton including the equivalence class computation,
agents, and policies in 495 lines of Promela and 2,854 lines of C++ code, excluding the
SPIN model checker.
Using Plankton, we evaluated BGP in a data center setting, which is often employed to
provide layer 3 routing down to the rack level in modern data centers [52]. We configure
BGP as described in RFC 7938 [52] on fat trees of various sizes. Furthermore, we suppose
that the network operator intends that traffic should pass through any of a set of acceptable
waypoints on the aggregation layer switches. (This may be because the switches implement
certain middlebox functionality; we pick a random subset of aggregation switches as the




Figure 5.6: Showing Graph Diff computed for AS-733 dataset. (a) shows the effect of varying
the window size and (b) shows the trend for Graph Diff on adjacency graphs and reachability
graphs of the same networks.
multipath from being used and fails to steer routes through the waypoints. Thus, in this




Figure 5.7: Showing NCD and Graph Diff computed for AS-733 dataset where each network
state is compared to 10 previous states (i.e. W = 10) . (a) shows the metrics on the
reachability graphs of the networks and (b) shows the same on the adjacency graphs.
updates are received at various nodes, due to age-based tiebreaking [53]. We check waypoint
policies which state that the path between two edge switches should pass through one of the
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Figure 5.8: Information reduction using our inference engine
waypoints. Plankton evaluates various nondeterministic convergence paths in the network,
and determines a violating sequence of events.
To further exercise Plankton’s diverse policy capabilities in-real world settings, we run
Plankton on fat trees and AS topologies, running OSPF. For fat trees, the link weights are
assigned uniformly by us. Link weights for AS topologies were obtained from RocketFuel
[54]. We assume that each device can advertise a set of prefixes. We check two types of
policies - loop freedom for individual packets, and reachability in converged states. Both
of these policies are checked under single link failures. While violations are found for loop
freedom, in the case of reachability, due to the nature of the networks we chose and the fact
that this policy queries only the converged states, no violation was reported in any of the
runs. We perform each experiment both single threaded, as well as with 16 threads.
Figure 5.9: Policy violations in VNFs
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As a test setup for Plankton-neo, we verify a network with 4 switches and a virtualized
iptables firewall, as illustrated in Figure 5.9 a. It shows a virtualized firewall running on a
server, configured to perform standard stateful filtering — block connection attempts from
outside the organization, but allow replies to past requests. Additionally, the dataplane rules
are installed such that requests and replies follow different paths, as shown. In this setup,
one may expect that requests originating from inside, and their replies should not be blocked.
An intuitive model-based verification platform may even declare that these conditions hold.
However, in the real world, when running a virtualized firewall using iptables on Linux,
the behavior of this setup depends on specific configuration variables in the kernel that runs
the firewall. For example, when the rp filter variable is enabled, the kernel performs
reverse-path filtering — for each packet it forwards, it constructs a hypothetical reply and
tries injecting it into the outgoing port for the current packet. If this hypothetical reply
does not go out the incoming interface of the current packet, the current packet is dropped.
This would cause the reachability requirements in our example to be violated. The policy we
verify is that the request and reply traffic reach their respective destinations. When reverse
path filtering is enabled, the firewall blocks the request traffic, causing the policy to fail.
However, when we disable reverse path filtering in the kernel, the policy passed.
Figure 5.10: Policy enforcement in a multi-tenant data center
To test our approach at scale, we perform an experiment inspired by [55]. We consider
a multi-tenant datacenter with varying number of tenants, with two types of traffic —
whitelisted or greylisted. Each tenant also has two types of servers — public or private.
Initially, each tenant allows all traffic to public servers, but for private servers, whitelisted
traffic is always allowed, and for greylisted traffic, only replies to past requests are allowed.
40
We use iptables running on Ubuntu 14.04 to enforce the policies, as shown in Figure 5.10.
This use of a real VNF implementation is what distinguishes our experiment from similar
experiments in past work [55]. In our test, we assume that some of the tenants now wish to
reclassify HTTP from greylisted to whitelisted . This change is implemented by updating
two routers. Naturally, at any point during the transition, the correctness spec for the
network states that no legitimate reply to a past request be dropped. In our experiments,
Plankton-neo finds the following violation. Access switch S1 gets updated before the request
packet reaches it. So, the request is forwarded directly to S2, without passing through the
firewall. The reply packet reaches S2, before S2 is updated with the new policy. Abiding by
the old policy, S2 forwards the reply to the iptables firewall. The firewall drops the reply,




We used a Dell Precision Tower 5810. The machine was equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2697 v3 @ 2.60GHz CPU with 14 cores and Intel(R) Hyper-Threading Technology
enabled to run up to 28 threads, a Seagate HDD (SATA 6.0Gb/s) and a Samsung 4 x
32GB DDR4 RAM. This machine was used to run all the experiments for the analysis and
the verification modules. However, a different machine was used for running the inference
module experiments with a 4 core Intel(R) i7 @ 3.40GHz and 32GB DDR3 RAM.
6.2 PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKS
6.2.1 Analysis
Figure 6.1 shows the time taken and memory usage to compute NCD and Graph Diff (for
adjacency graphs) in our experiments run on the AS-733 dataset. It can be seen that the
memory usage of Graph Diff approach is much higher because it keeps a window of graphs
in-memory uncompressed whereas the NCD approach at the beggining of computations
compresses all the image files and keeps them all in-memory. Also note that the time taken to
process a snapshot using Graph Diff is much lesser compared to performing NCD operations
(which involve a sufficient amount of computation when compressing the concatenation of
various image pairs.) Also, the time taken to generate graphs (one graph with about 3500
vertices and 13500 edges takes approximately 0.02s to generate, another one with about
5500 vertices and 22000 edges takes about 0.04s to generate) is lesser than the time taken
to generate the images (one image takes about 20s to generate) used by NCD. In order to
generate images, first the graph is generated and then mappings are performed to output a
2D matrix with appropriate cordinates computed to represent network devices on the image.
In practice, we make use of multiple cores to generate images in parallel as the nature of
this computation is embarrassingly parallel with no dependency of one image generation to




Figure 6.1: (a) Maximum time taken to process one AS-733 snapshot (b) Max resident
memory usage while processing all AS-733 snapshots
6.2.2 Inference
Figure 6.2 shows the time taken to run the inference engine on the enterprise network
mentioned in Section 5.3. It can be seen that using 4 cores through OpenMP gives a
significant boost to performance. We develop our framework such that adding packet sets
from multiple snapshots to the R-Tree can be done in parallel (with a couple of atomic
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Figure 6.2: Time taken by the inference engine
operations) and the querying for intersections can be done in parallel as well. Since the
process of inference is not something that a network operator would want to do in real-time,
nor is it something that needs to be done frequently, the time taken for the process to finish
given enough compute resources is acceptable.
6.2.3 Plankton
Figure 6.3 illustrates the average and worst-case time taken by Plankton to finish the BGP
(in data center) check described in Section 5.4. Time and memory both depend somewhat
on the chosen set of aggregation switches.
The time taken and memory consumed to carry out the RocketFuel experiments described
in Section 5.4 are illustrated in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. For fat-trees of 1280 nodes, the reach-
ability check consumes 28.5GB of RAM, running single threaded. Given the symmetry of
the network, we expect a run with 16 threads to use close to 500GB of RAM. While this is
not unreasonable for a network this large, we avoid running the experiment ourselves.
We compare Plankton with Minesweeper; the former has an expanded scope of function-
ality, but on scenarios both are able to verify, we show 143× single-threaded speed improve-
ments, with both the basic architecture and the optimizations playing a significant role in
the speedup. Our experiments so far have focused on the correctness and effectiveness of
Plankton as a platform that enables new verification functionality (where, therefore, a direct
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Figure 6.5: Memory consumed for various policies under single link failure, with P = 1 and
P = 16 parallel threads.
2* Experiment Plankton 2* Minesweeper
16 threads 1 thread
20-node Fat Tree 0.04 s 0.13 s 1.44 s
45-node Fat Tree 0.17 s 1.44 s 206.57 s
320-node Fat Tree 77.06 s 966.39 s ¿ 20 hours (stopped)
AS 1755 3.55 s 48.31 s 4046.74 s
AS 3967 2.56 s 35.08 s 6894.28 s
Figure 6.6: Comparison of Plankton with Minesweeper.
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Experiment Single emulation Multiple Emulation
64 Tenants, no update 5835.52 s 4732.13 s
32 Tenants, no update 680.28 s 413.84 s
64 Tenants, all tenants update 29.22 s 27.73 s
Figure 6.7: Single emulated device vs. one per middlebox
pares to prior approaches, for use cases that do not require the full capabilities of Plankton.
To evaluate this, we solve the same verification problems using Plankton, and the current
state-of-the-art, Minesweeper. We verify the reachability policy in the converged states of
various networks under single-link failures. We choose the reachability policy because it is
usually not violated due to single link failures, meaning that the verifier needs to explore all
possible converged states of the system, and then conclude that the policy passes. Figure
6.6 illustrates the measurements we obtain from the various runs. In our experiments, we
observed that Minesweeper ran single-threaded except for parsing the input, possibly due to
a unified model for the entire network, unlike the partitioned model of Plankton. For a direct
comparison, we perform Plankton’s checks in single threaded mode also. Plankton performs
around two orders of magnitude better in all cases. For networks with high symmetry, the
larger the network, the higher the speedup, thanks to Plankton’s device-equivalence opti-
mization. However, the speedup in Plankton is not just due to symmetry. This is illustrated
by the higher performance observed for the RocketFuel AS topologies, which do not benefit
from the symmetry-based optimizations in Plankton, and indicating that our architectural
approach has benefits.
6.2.4 Plankton-neo
As described in Section 4.3.3 we restore the state of the middleboxes by replaying the
history of prior packets before injecting new packets. But doing so has an impact on per-
formance, due to the inherently high latency incurred in update replay (See Figure 6.8 b).
When using a separate emulation for each middlebox, there is a higher likelyihood that the
emulated middlebox is in the same state as expected by the verifier, and hence, does not
require additional state restoration. We empirically evaluate this design choice by repeating
the multi-tenant data center experiment using a single emulation setup for all middleboxes.
Figure 6.7 compares observations. For our test case, having separate emulation for each
middlebox produces as much as 39% improvement in the time spent. This can be further
improved by having multiple emulated devices to run the same middlebox. In general, the re-
lationship between the middleboxes in the network and the emulation setups in Plankton-neo
47
Figure 6.8: Measurements from data center experiment
can be many-to-many. A full exploration remains to be done.
We perform the experiment mentioned in Section 5.4 with different number of tenants,
with varying number of tenants performing the whitelisting change. Figure 6.8 a illustrates
the time and memory used by a single run of the test (Time and number of tenants axes
are logarithmic). When the fraction is 0, there are no changes being made, and hence, the
policy passes. When at least one tenant updates its policy, a violation of the policy exists,
and we correctly find it.
Figure 6.8 a provides some interesting insights into the nature of the problem. Intuitively,
the verification problem is hardest when there is no update happening in the network. This
is because the testing procedure has to exhaust every possible execution and finally declare
that the policy holds. This is reflected in the time and memory consumption.
Figure 6.8 b illustrates the CDF of the latency incurred in performing packet injection
and observing the outcome. It is clear that there exist two different groups of latency
measurements. The faster one indicates packet processing at line rate, without having to
restore middlebox state or wait for timeouts. This is the case where the emulated middlebox
is in the same state as the one the verifier requires it to be, and the packet that is newly
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injected does not get dropped. The slower set of measurements may be caused due to timeout
or state restoration.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
7.1 CONCLUSION
Modern day networks are evolving at a fast pace in terms of the number of devices,
complexity of interaction and the sophistication of policies enforced. This, though making
the networks extremely efficient and highly performant, poses high risks in terms of security
of the network infrastructure and the applications using it. As the complexity grows, the
attack surface along with the likelihood of unintentional misconfigurations of the network
also grows dramatically as can be seen in a lot of production networks in the recent past. This
opens up room for working towards efficient mechanisms of analysing the networks states over
time, making sure the network is obeying the specified invariants and no anomalous events
are occuring in the network. To achieve this end, we propose an end-to-end framework for
analysing existing networks, inferring from them the policies that have been enforced without
explicitly having to enumerate them all. Finally, we present a formal verification tool that
performs explicit-state verification of a network model defined over equivalence classes that
is capable of verifying control plane and cross-layer network dynamics, including properties
that are themselves temporal in nature.
7.2 FUTURE WORK
Most of the implementation and experimentation performed for the proposed techniques
has a lot of room for improvement before they can be used in production settings. This
involves making all the modules interact with each other efficiently, distribution of non-
dependent tasks to execute simultaneously and reducing the memory footprint to be able to
scale the system to larger networks. We also intend to evaluate the proposed framework on
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